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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction under the Court's order issued pursuant to Rule 5, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, granting the Petitioner leave to appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent takes issue with the Petitioner's Statement of Issues and Standards of 
Review. First, the Petitioner's Statement fails to provide any "citation to the record showing 
that the issue was preserved in the trial court" as required by Rule 24(a)(5(A), Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. The only reference with regard to preservation of issues is to the 
Petitioner's motion for protective order. Such motion asserted only that the material sought 
through the Respondent's discovery requests was not relevant and was being sought only to 
harass and embarrass the Petitioner. Second, the only issues properly appealed and before 
this Court deal specifically with the trial court's denial of the Petitioner's motion for 
protective order and do not include whether a basis exists for modifying custody in this case 
or whether the Utah courts should adopt a new standard for determining custody where 
initial custody determinations are uncontested. Based thereon, the only issues properly 
presented for review are as follows. 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the Petitioner to respond to 
discovery requests propounded by the Respondent and seeking information regarding 
Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities for periods both before and after the parties' 
divorce, where the Respondent was not aware of such activities at the time of divorce and 
where such fads were not before the court at the time the court approved the parties' 
stipulated custody arrangements? 
The standard of review applied to determine whether the trial court erred in requiring 
that the Petitioner provide such discovery, is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999); Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering the Petitioner to respond to 
discovery requests propounded by the Respondent and seeking information regarding 
Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities for periods both before and after the parties' 
divorce, due to the court's reasoning that such information is relevant with regard to the 
Petitioner's moral conduct and parenting ability? 
The standard of review applied to determine whether the trial court erred in requiring 
that the Petitioner provide such discovery, is whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
Roundy v. Staley, 984 P.2d 404 (Utah App. 1999); Langeland v. Monarch Motors, Inc., 952 
P.2d 1058 (Utah 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent does not oppose the Petitioner's Statement of the Case, except with 
regard to paragraph 12. As is apparent from the trial court's ruling (Record at 597 - 604), 
while the trial court did refer to language in the case of Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 
1989), the trial court did not rely solely upon such case as a basis for its ruling. The trial 
court further did not rely upon a ruling that the Respondent was not required to show a 
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change of circumstances at trial of tins \ ather relied upon the fact that newly 
discovered evidence relevant to this matter was not before the court at the time of divorce 
(Record at 200). 
In addition to the above, the crux of this matter revolves around information obtained 
by the Respondent in late 2000, which prompted the filing of the counter-petition below 
seeking a change of custody. In late 2000, the Respondent came into possession of excerpts 
from the diary of irty which evidence an extramarital sexual relationship between 
the Petitioner and a man in Cedar City, Utah, lioni ;u least October 1996 through December 
1996. Such diary entries refer to the Petitioner arriving at the mans home, having sexual 
relations with him, and spending the night there, all while Petitioner and Respondent were 
still married. Additionally, these relations included times when the man's children were in 
the home and while the man's live-in girlfriend was present in the home The Petitioner 
knew of the relationship between the man and the live-in girlfriend at the time and knew that 
the man maintained sexual relationships with numerous other women at the same time. 
Additionally, the excerpts refer to certain I illuo itul other mechanisms which the man used 
to "mark" his women. Petitioner had one such tattoo and other "marking" before the 
Petitioner and Respondent divorced but explained to the Respondent that the "marking" was 
done by a lesbian friend of the Petitioner's. Petitioner repeatedly denied any extramarital 
sexual involvement both before and after the parties' divorce. I he diary entries are found 
in the record at pages 520 - 536. The Respondent was investigating the information he had 
obtained at the i he Petitioner fih i her petition to modify in the trial court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This appeal deals with discovery issues and only discovery issues. However, the 
analysis in the Petitioner's brief is suited to a case where the Petitioner is contesting a trial 
court's modification of a custody decree. Indeed, the Petitioner goes so far as to seek this 
Court's abandonment of the current standards applicable to all cases where a modification 
of custody is sought after a nonlitigated decree is entered. Thus, Petitioner has turned a 
simple discovery matter into a crusade for custody reform. Additionally, Petitioner's 
arguments extend only to discovery sought for matters occurring prior to the parties' original 
divorce and subsequent modification of the custody decree. Yet Petitioner summarily asserts 
that the trial court's order requiring disclosure of extramarital relations after such dates 
should also, for some reason, be reversed. 
The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in requiring production of the discovery 
requested by the Respondent because such evidence is "clearly irrelevant to establish the 
prerequisite change in circumstances" (Petitioner's Brief page 9); the trial court "failed to 
make . . . findings [that a material change in circumstances has occurred] (Petitioner's Brief 
page 10), the trial court "failed to find any evidence that any asserted change in 
circumstances was material, and . . . Respondent has failed to provide such evidence" 
(Petitioner's Brief page 11), the trial court "erroneously found that material evidence was not 
before the court issuing the decree . . . ." (Petitioner's Brief page 11), and the trial court 
"conclude[d] that the disputed evidence was material to the children's welfare without 
finding that there was evidence to support such a conclusion." (Petitioner's Brief page 12). 
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In essence, Petitioner argues that the trial court should have required the Respondent to prove 
his case in support of a change of custody before the Petitioner was required to provide the 
Respondent with the requested discovery. Petitioner's arguments are apparently based upon 
Petitioner's assumption that the Respondent cannot prevail in his action in chief and thus the 
trial court should not ha\ e i eqi lired the pi oduction of the requested discovery. However, the 
requested discovery is essential to a determination of whether there is a material change in 
circumstances and whether the best interests of the children will be served by a change in 
custody. etitioner's arguments would require the Respondent to prove a change in 
circumstances before being allowed t^ain discovery as to the true nature of the 
circumstances at the time of the divorce and since. Such is not reqitired. The trial court 
properly noted that although the court was ordering that the discovery be provided, "the 
burden remains upon Respondenl to prove the allegations, but both sides must be allowed 
discovery to prepare the case." (Record at 601). Ihus, the day for Petitioner's arguments 
with regard to the test applied to the instant custody modification will be at a trial ot the 
matter, i appeal of a discovery order. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. The Trial Court Properly Applied Existing Case Law In Denying 
Petitioner's Motion For Protective Order, 
Urn Supivme Court has described the policy behind our discovery rules. In Ellis v. 
Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967), the Court noted that the purpose of the discovery 
procedure in the Rules of Civil Procedure is: 
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to make procedure as simple and efficient as possible by eliminating any 
useless ritual, undue rigidities or technicalities . . . and to remove elements of 
surprise or trickery so the parties and the court can determine the facts and 
resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible In accord 
with this is the beginning policy statement in Rule 1(a): that the rules "shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action." 
In State v. Petty, 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966), 1he Court also noted this same purpose and then 
stated 
One of the means of accomplishing this is to permit discovery of information 
which will aid in eliminating noncontroversial matters, and in identifying, 
narrowing, and clarifying the issues on which contest may prove to be 
necessary. Insofar as discovery will serve this purpose it should be liberally 
permitted. 
Thus, anything bearing on the issue of custody modification or which would render that issue 
moot, narrow the issues, or lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with regard to that 
issue is disco\ erable. The Petitioner filed her motion seeking a protective order claiming that 
the discovery sought with regard to any past and on-going extramarital sexual relations of 
the Petitioner was irrelevant and sought only to embarrass and harass the Petitioner. It was 
in that context that the trial court correctly entered its order denying the Petitioner's motion. 
In determining what is "relevant to the subject matter" of a case and thus discoverable 
under Rule 26(b), the Utah Supreme Court noted 
In considering what is the "subject matter" of a lawsuit we keep in mind that 
the ultimate objective of any lawsuit is a determination of the dispute between 
the parties; and that the earlier and easier this can be accomplished, with 
justice to both sides, the better for all concerned. Whatever helps to attain that 
objective is "relevant" to the lawsuit. 
Ellis v. Gilbert, Id 
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court's order 1 CUMv Jiv- *h n !••<* . ;uence was in error because the 
trial court "held thai a substantial change of circumstances need no( I'M SJIMWM in im nl'il\ a 
snpulaicd child custoay decree The Petitioner opines that had the trial court interpreted 
the case of Elmer v. " 'i; - ' •  * way Petitioner interprets such 
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 4 .. •, d 
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Respondent was tc\\c.\ cd of any obligation to show" a material change of dn uni'dam < •• I id 
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because i.asc mw :iuids tiiat a u e reopened when material facts 
were not before the court, even in eases vvliere the best interest of the child has 
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was siuipK based upc n a stipulation, if there are material facts which were not 
presented. 1 he questions as to Petitioner's extramarital affairs are therefore 
certainly -I.*\ *n( ?M wdcr to determine whether such material facts exist. 
(Record at GOO i 11 n d that the requested discovery should be 
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*•« • I that . \'.'ii when an initial decree has adjudicated the bests interests id a 
:
 i ,• subsequent proceeding could reopen that decree if material facts wcie 
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not before the court (citations omitted), or if the circumstances pertaining to 
the decree had subsequently changed, so that a new determination should be 
made based on a full development of all material facts. 
Elmer at 604. What the trial court did in ruling on the Petitioner's discovery motion was 
exactly what the Utah Supreme Court stated in Elmer. The trial court determined that the 
requested discovery was relevant and should be provided as such information was not before 
the court at the time of the decree. 
Additionally, the Respondent has asserted a substantial change in circumstances in 
this case. Shortly before the Petitioner filed her petition to modify the parties' stipulated 
decree, the Respondent was provided with information regarding extramarital sexual 
activities of the Petitioner. However, prior to and after the parties' divorce, the Respondent 
had heard rumors regarding alleged extramarital sexual activities by the Petitioner and 
confronted the Petitioner. The Petitioner at all times denied such activities as depicted in the 
newly discovered evidence. The Petitioner's denial of such activities and the Respondent's 
reliance thereon was one of the material facts relied upon by the Respondent in not 
contesting the current custody arrangement. If such activities had been known, Respondent 
would have contested custody in the Petitioner and sought sole custody (Record at 510 -
511). 
As was also properly found by the trial court, the information requested in the 
Respondent's discovery requests as to the Petitioner's past and current extramarital sexual 
activities is certainly "relevant" to the subject matter of this case under the Utah Code. In 
ordering that the Petitioner provide the requested discovery, the trial court noted, "Utah Code 
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subsequent modification, the information could have been obtained through discovery. Thus, 
the information is admittedly relevant. However, the Petitioner now asserts that, due only 
to the passage of time and the Petitioner's continued denial of any extramarital sexual 
relationships, the information has somehow become irrelevant. Such is not logical. The 
Respondent's reliance on the Petitioner's continued reassurances that extramarital sexual 
activities were not occurring should not now work to her advantage by somehow claiming 
that the information should have been sought earlier. At the time of the original divorce, the 
parties had agreed to joint legal custody with equal time to the children. Certainly some 
amount of trust had to be in place and the Respondent trusted the Petitioner's statements 
denying sexual relationships existed. Additionally, the Respondent was in the position of 
having the children one-half of the time, a situation which no longer exists. 
IL The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion As Argued By The Petitioner 
Since No Evidence Was Admitted, 
In her second argument, as summarized in her brief, the Petitioner, asserts that "the 
trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the best interests of the children 
before determining that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances 
since the entry of the decree." (Petitioner's Brief page 28) (Emphasis supplied). The error 
in Petitioner's theory is that the trial court did not "admit" any evidence. The trial court 
merely ruled that the Petitioner has to supply Respondent with the requested discovery. The 
issue as to whether any of the information obtained by the Respondent through discovery 
will be admitted into evidence will be made only at trial. As stated above, the requested 
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discovery certainly comes within the parameters of Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and therefore, the trial court's order denying the Petitioner's motion for protective order was 
proper. 
The Petitioner argues that Utah case law requires a strict application of the changed 
circumstances test to this case despite the court's ruling in the Elmer case. Petitioner asserts 
that cases subsequent to Elmer limit the court's ruling in Elmer to cases where custody is 
determined by default. Initially, it must be stated that such argument is, again, not directed 
or applicable to the discovery issue on appeal before this Court. Such argument is more 
appropriate after or in connection with a determination by a trial court of what evidence will 
be admitted regarding a custody modification and in what order such evidence should be 
taken. In any event, the Petitioner's alleged modification of the Elmer ruling has not 
occurred. Despite Petitioner's contention, in Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 
1991), this Court applied the Elmer rationale to the case before it even though such case 
involved a stipulated custody decree rather than one entered by default. In Crouse v. Crouse, 
817P.2d836 (Utah App. 1991), this Court again upheld the Elmer rule in a case dealing with 
a stipulated custody decree. In that case, the trial court had not taken evidence on the best 
interests of the child as part of the evidence relating to a change in circumstances. This 
Court found the trial court did not abuse its discretion by choosing not to allow such 
evidence to be presented prior to a determination of a change in circumstances. However, 
this Court at no time abandoned or ruled improper the use of the Elmer rule in such cases. 
Finally, in Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991),this Court again 
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addressed a case involving a requested modification of a stipulated custody decree. In that 
case, this Court again applied the Elmer rule. "We find that even under the Elmer 
evidentiary standard, the changes are not sufficient to constitute a substantial or material 
change of circumstances." Id. at 479. Thus, this Court has not, and should not, abandon the 
Elmer rule or require more of a showing for its application other than that the decree sought 
to be modified was not litigated. Thus, the trial court's ruling in this case should be upheld. 
Even were the Court to find validity in Petitioner's argument that the Elmer rule 
should not be applied to cases resolved by stipulation, it would have no impact on the 
discovery issues presented here. The application of the rule, again, deals with evidence 
presented at trial and the manner of such presentation and is not a limitation on discovery. 
However, Petitioner argues that based upon the holding in Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, as 
interpreted in Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 and Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 
unless "exceptional circumstances" exist, the modified rule under Elmer does not apply to 
a custody modification sought with regard to a stipulated custody decree. Petitioner wrongly 
asserts that exceptional circumstances are defined by the courts as only "an initial custody 
award premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal custody arrangements, 
a default case," or where " the refusal to change custody will result in the continuation of 
custody in a parent who is indifferent to, or even destructive of, the child's welfare." 
(Petitioner's Brief page 28 - 29). In reality, the cases cited by the Petitioner do not require 
a showing of "exceptional circumstances" but refer to certain times when it may be 
appropriate to require a showing of what this Court refers to as "exceptional criteria" before 
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considering evidence of the best interests of a child as part of the evidence establishing 
changed circumstances. Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, such cases do not define what 
constitute exceptional criteria but merely give examples of some criteria which may qualify 
as such. In the Petitioner's cited cases, this Court gives no absolute definition but rather 
describes exceptional criteria as "such as an initial custody award premised on a temporary 
condition, a choice between marginal custody arrangements, or a default decree." Crouse, 
817 P.2d at 840, Cummings, 821 P.2d at 478, Walton, 814 P.2d at 623. 
It is obvious that this Court in the above cases did not intend to limit what constitutes 
exceptional criteria. It is also obvious that evidence of extramarital relationships which was 
not known to the Respondent and not before the court at the time of the original decree 
herein or the modification thereof, constitute such exceptional criteria for proceeding under 
Elmer. Based thereon, the trial court's order that the Petitioner herein respond to discovery 
with regard to prior and ongoing extramarital sexual relationships is certainly within the trial 
court's discretion. 
III. The Trial Court Properly Found That Material Evidence Was Not Before 
The Court At The Time Of The Original Decree And Modification. 
The Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in finding that information regarding 
the Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities was not before the court at the time of the 
original decree or the subsequent modification. However, it is undisputed that such 
information was not before the court. The reason it was not before the court was due to the 
Petitioner's repeated assurance that the rumors regarding possible extramarital sexual 
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activities were false. The parties had worked long at trying to first save their seventeen year 
marriage and then at reaching a fair resolution of their divorce proceedings with the least 
impact on the parties' children. Based upon the Petitioner's repeated assurances, the 
Respondent chose to trust the Petitioner rather than chase rumors which Petitioner denied. 
It is clear that the propounded discovery is intended to bring before the trial court the true 
circumstances at the time of the parties' original divorce and those existing since such time 
so that a full and fair determination may be made by the trial court with regard to whether 
changed circumstances exist and the best interests of the parties' children. 
IV. This Court Should Not Modify The Existing Rules Nor Abandon Existing 
Precedent Establishing The Standards To Be Applied With Regard To 
Modifications Of Stipulated Custody Decrees. 
The Petitioner's final argument is that this Court, in determining the propriety of a 
trial court's discovery order, should rewrite the existing standards applicable to modifications 
to stipulated custody decrees. This is not the context in which to make such a modification, 
especially in light of the fact that no determination has as yet been made in the trial court as 
to whether either the Petitioner's or Respondent's requested modifications should be granted, 
nor what evidence is admissible with regard to such claims. If such an argument is made at 
all on appeal, it should be made by Petitioner only after an adverse ruling applying the 
standard thai Petitioner now seeks to change. Additionally, in light of the well established 
history and rationale surrounding the existing Elmer standard, such standard should remain. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly acted within its discretion in denying the Petitioner's motion 
for protective order and requiring the Petitioner to disclose information regarding the 
Petitioner's prior and on-going extramarital sexual activities. Such information is relevant 
to this case, to whether changed circumstances exist, and to whether a change in custody 
would be in the best interest of the parties' children. Such ends the analysis of this case. 
The Respondent should be allowed such discovery in order to establish the true 
circumstances of the Petitioner's extramarital sexual activities both before the divorce and 
on an on-going basis. Such allowance certainly comports with the overriding interest 
involved in this case and as enumerated by the Petitioner's cited authorities, that being the 
best interest of the parties' children. Based thereon, the Respondent respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the trial court's ruling denying the Petitioner's motion for protective 
order and requiring that the requested discovery be provided. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of May, 2003. 
Gary G^Kuhlmann 
Respondent and Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on May 12, 2003, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be mailed First Class mail, postage prepaid to Chad J. Utley, counsel for 
Petitioner, at 189 North Main Street, P.O. Box 2408, St. George, Utah 84771-2408. 
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